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BREAKING THE STALEMATE: THE
JUDICIARY’S CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN
DISPUTES OVER THE WAR POWERS
R. Andrew Smith∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the goal of the three-part American government
structure is to separate and balance the power to govern.1 Separation
prevents any branch of the government from straying from its intended
purpose and in turn, fosters democratic values as a result.2 Ideally, this
prevents one branch of government from over-exercising its power over
the others. However, language in the Constitution gives little guidance
on when one branch of the government may be acting outside the sphere
of its authority. Constitutional ambiguities and overlapping powers
result in struggles between different arms of the government. The
purpose of this Article is to explore the role of the judiciary in mediating
the power struggles between the legislative and executive branches of
government. Justiciability restrictions, such as the political question
doctrine, can make the Court’s role in such disputes unclear. Recently,
the disclosure of President Bush’s warrantless electronic surveillance
program3 and subsequent lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
program4 have thrown these intra-governmental tensions into sharp
relief by questioning the breadth of the executive war power5 juxtaposed
to the legislative war power.6
In this Article, President Bush’s
warrantless domestic surveillance program provides a focal point for
analysis of separation of powers in general and the problem of
overlapping constitutional grants of authority.

∗
R. Andrew Smith graduated from the Valparaiso University School of Law in 2006,
and is licensed to practice in the state of Illinois. At the time of publication, he worked for
the City of Chicago Law Department in the Municipal Prosecution Division. He would like
to thank the Valparaiso University Law Review, Brenda Likavec for the opportunity, Professor
JoEllen Lind for her assistance in developing the concept for this article and for her
continual guidance, and his family and close friends for all of the support they provided
that helped make this possible.
1
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 300-03 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic 2003).
2
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 314-17.
3
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WL 20281359.
4
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
5
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
6
Id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11-16.
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II. THE STALEMATE PROBLEM
The Constitution reflects James Madison’s concept of multifaceted
government.7 However, the powers annunciated in Article II fail to
clearly define the powers of the executive branch.8 The division of
power between the three branches, the ambiguous nature of power
provided to the president, and the Supreme Court’s use of the political
question doctrine ultimately create an impasse between the three
branches and their constitutionally delegated power.
A. The Separation of Powers
The purpose of separating governmental function is to prevent a
tyrannical majority from coming to power.9 A reasonable construction of
the Constitution requires keeping the three branches separate “in all
cases in which they were not expressly blended.”10 However, the
constitutional text itself blends some governmental activities. These
intersections of power between the branches operate to curb the
unilateral control of any one branch over the others and supports the
notion of “checks and balances,” which works in conjunction with the
separation of powers.11 However, the Constitution should not be
interpreted to blend the operation of the branches more than its text
requires12 because such an interpretation would allow one branch to
usurp the power of another branch subverting the liberty interests that
undergird the structure.
This structure prevents Congress from
removing or including itself in the exercise of another branch’s power.13
The Supreme Court has used the separation of powers to invalidate
legislation that permitted Congress to invade the president’s
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 58 (1998).
Wood articulates that the structure of the government operates to cultivate independent
liberty, aiming to minimize government officials’ tendencies toward self-interested
corruption. Id.; see also Jeffrey Rudd, Restructuring America’s Government to Create
Sustainable Development, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 371, 415 (2006).
8
U.S. CONST. art. II.
9
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1.
10
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926). In Myers, the Court considered an act
of Congress proscribing the ability of the president to discharge the Postmaster General. Id.
In invalidating the statute, the Court concluded that Congress cannot annex power
attributed to other branches of government unless the Constitution expressly authorizes
the mix of governmental power between multiple branches of the government. See id. at
163-65.
11
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 295.
12
Id.
13
Myers, 272 U.S. at 159-60.
7
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appointment power,14 define the extent to which Congress may create
rules of procedure for the courts,15 preserve the finality of judicial
determinations,16 and limit the exercise of judicial power.17 In many
ways, the separation of powers doctrine has been used to preserve the
power attributed to the judiciary in the Constitution.18 However, these
examples also illustrate an operational problem within the doctrine.

Id. at 52.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the federal
sentencing guidelines were not a violation of the separation of powers). But see United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the Court invalidated the two provisions of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that required the courts to apply the guidelines in every
criminal case. Id. Invalidating the mandatory aspects of the guidelines effectively reset the
boundary of legislative restrictions on the operation of federal courts. Id. at 250-53. This is
not entirely inconsistent with existing law. For example, in United States v. Union Pacific
Rail Company, the Supreme Court considered the extent of Congress’s ability to alter
definitions of “troops” to take advantage of the Land Grant Acts. 249 U.S. 354 (1919). The
Land Grant Acts generally provided that the government could move its property and
troops over the roads and rails free of charge or at a reduced cost. Id. at 355-56. Ultimately,
the Court held that the legislature could not expand the meaning of “troops” to include
individuals not rightly classified as members of the military in order to take advantage of
the free use provisions of the Land Use Acts. Id. at 358-61. Like Booker, the Union Pacific
case prevents Congress from expanding its ability to redefine what constitutes members of
the military and reserves the power to determine where costs apply to the Comptroller of
the Treasury and the lead administrators of the military, all of whom are agents of the
executive branch.
16
See Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 512 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court considered whether the Environmental Protection
Agency has the power to block the construction of diesel generators permitted by the
Alaskan Department of Environmental Conservation because the product of the
construction would violate the Clean Air Act. Id. at 468. The majority ultimately
determined that the EPA had the ability to issue the order to cease the construction
notwithstanding the state permit. Id. Justice Kennedy’s dissent points out the error in this
ruling by noting the fundamental conflict between rulings by executive agencies and the
operation of Article III courts. Kennedy specifically stated that the legislative and
executive branches may not revise the decisions of Article III courts making the decisions
final and binding. Id. at 512 (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 2 Dallas 409, 410, 1 L. Ed.
436 (1792); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)).
17
There are numerous cases using the separation of powers doctrine to render an issue
before the court non-cognizable. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). In
Harbury, the Court considered a challenge to government limitations on information under
the auspice of international relations in the murder of a Guatemalan citizen. Id. at 405. The
Court refused to address the issue, citing separation of powers concerns as part of its
reason for finding the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Id. at 416.
18
See generally In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) (holding that Congress may not execute
legislation which limits the power of the courts to issue contempt citations).
14
15
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Though the purpose of delineating governmental powers aims to
preserve the people’s liberty interest,19 the Supreme Court has observed
that the perfect operation of this concept is largely theoretical and
unattainable in practice.20 In Federalist No. 48, James Madison explicitly
stated that a strict practical application of separate powers is
pragmatically impossible.21 Rather, the doctrine should operate in a way
that would prevent one branch from invading the powers of another.22
Madison’s own conclusion at the end of Federalist No. 48 notes that the
mere demarcation of government structure on paper is insufficient to
guard against government tyranny.23
The operation of the judiciary in this scheme is summed up in
Federalist No. 78, where Alexander Hamilton stated that the separated
powers will allow the judiciary to keep the legislature “within the limits
assigned to their authority.”24 Somewhere between the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine and its practical application rests a
momentary vacuum of government power. Ideally, the doctrine of the
separation of powers operates to prevent this power gap by permitting
the judiciary to interpret and define the divisions of power.
But unfortunately, the language of the Constitution is not always
clear. The overlapping powers attributed to the president in Article II
and to the legislature in Article I exemplify this ambiguity. These mixed
responsibilities create problems of constitutional interpretation and blur
the operation of the separate powers.
B. The Shared War Power
The War power is a primary example of the conflicts that arise when
the Constitution grants dual powers to two branches of government. For
instance, the president retains the power to direct the armed forces, but
Congress has the ability to restrain the president’s power to act as the
Commander in Chief. It is important to parse out the distinct powers of
each branch before analyzing the tension between them.

19
See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1; FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison), supra note 1.
20
Brush v. Ware, 40 U.S. 93, 99 (1841).
21
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 300.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 303.
24
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 472.
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The Executive Branch

The language in the Constitution describing the powers of the
executive branch and the legislative branch limit each arm of the
government in different ways.25 The only clear power possessed by the
executive is the power to execute federal laws; the structure of the
Constitution itself demonstrates this narrow construction of executive
power.26 However, Article II also includes other powers inherent only to
the president, indicating that the executive power is greater than just the
execution of the law.27 While the president lacks the fundamental
lawmaking power of Congress, this does not prevent the president from
affecting citizen’s rights.28 For example, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the president’s power as Commander in Chief to include his
ability to detain citizens and non-citizens to ensure national security.29
Similarly, current domestic surveillance programs directly implicate the
Fourth Amendment30 by subjecting citizens to searches without
warrants.31 The expansiveness of the language used by the framers also
seemingly expands the breadth of executive powers because the power
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 46.
Id.
27
Id. at 46-48.
28
Id. at 47-48.
29
See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that an American citizen
detained as an enemy combatant has a due process right to establish a factual basis for his
or her detention but not foreclosing the president’s power to detain a citizen in the name of
national security as an enemy combatant); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (concluding
that alien citizens detained as enemy combatants retain a due process right under a writ of
habeas corpus and the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment). The power here is
simply to detain, not detain indefinitely; however, the power to limit individual liberty
remains a significant infringement of otherwise constitutionally guaranteed rights.
30
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
31
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at A1. This article first appeared in The New York
Times on December 16, 2005. The authors discuss the details of a program instituted by
President Bush after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in New York City. The
program, later dubbed the Terrorist Surveillance Program, collected information through
telephone wire-taps of United States citizens without providing the protections of search
warrants. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D.
Mich. 2006). This has not been the only time the President has authorized a surveillance
program; he has also permitted the CIA and the NSA to collect transaction records for bank
transfers between American citizens and suspected Al Qaeda members or supporters.
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2006, at A1.
25
26
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of the Commander in Chief is not explicitly defined in Article II.32 By
contrast, the Constitution explicitly attributes different powers to the
legislative branch.
2.

The Legislative Branch

Article I, section eight of the Constitution provides a list of explicit
powers conferred upon Congress.33 Compared to the other provisions of
the Constitution, Article II provides Congress with the most expansive
power to act.34 In Federalist No. 48, James Madison noted that the
legislature retains superiority in the government because its powers are
more extensive and less susceptible to limitations placed on the other
branches.35 Moreover, Congress is the only part of the government with
specific power to collect money from the public.36 However, legislative
power still has its constitutional limits.
Historically, the Supreme Court has set the boundaries of
congressional power under Article I. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the
Court broadly defined Congress’s legislative authority.37 Under the
“Necessary and Proper” clause,38 the legislature retains the power to
create laws that allow the execution of constitutionally prescribed
duties.39 However, these powers are not absolute. The legislature does
not enjoy an unfettered ability to dictate policies on foreign affairs.40
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. at art. I, § 8.
34
See generally id. art I, § 8 (identifying legislative power); id. at art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2
(identifying executive power); id. at art. III, § 1, § 3, cl. 2 (identifying judicial power).
Article I, section eight provides the Congress with eighteen explicit powers, while Article
II, section two, provides the executive with five explicit powers. id. at art I, § 8; id. at art II,
§ 2. Article III, section one, states the predominant judiciary’s power to judge, but these
powers are more narrowly defined by the remainder of Article III, which limits the scope of
judicial jurisdiction. Id. at art. III.
35
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 302.
36
Id. The specific language demonstrates that “the legislative department alone has
access to the pockets of the people” means Congress is the only branch with the power to
lay taxes on the people.
37
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). The Supreme Court determined the breadth of
Congressional power by finding that the necessary and proper clause permitted Congress
to create a Bank of the United States under Congress’s authority to create currency. Id. at
324.
38
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
39
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 325.
40
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003). The Court noted specifically
that Congress does not retain total control over foreign affairs by stating that the president
has independent authority to act. Id. However, this does not prevent Congress from
regulating public and private dealings with other countries. Id. Interestingly, the Court’s
decision in Garamendi may have significantly limited the ability of Congress to create policy
32
33

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/4

Smith: Breaking the Stalemate: The Judiciary's Constitutional Role in D

2007]

Disputes over the War Powers

1523

Similarly, Congress does not retain the ability to legislate beyond the
scope of the powers defined within Article I.41 Congress may not act in
ways that would usurp the power of the other branches such as the
judiciary.42 But even with these limits, the Constitution permits the
legislature to enact laws that would control the actions of the judiciary
and the executive.43
While Article II and Article III of the Constitution designate specific
powers to the president and judiciary, these provisions also provide
Congress with authority to oversee the actions of these branches.44 This
structure leads to situations where the president can act in a manner
inconsistent with an act of Congress. One current area of this kind of
conflict involves the war powers possessed by the legislative and
executive branches.
3.

The Inherent Conflict in the War Powers

The text of Article II states that the president acts as the Commander
in Chief of the Army, Navy, and the Militia of the several states.45

in foreign affairs by providing greater latitude to the president in issuing this policy
through the State Department. See Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1898 (2006).
41
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court determined that
Congress acted outside its ability to regulate interstate commerce by making a law
preventing people from carrying guns within a school zone. Id. This particular law
reached past the breadth of the commerce clause, and affected an area within the control of
state law. Id. at 561 n.3.
42
See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). In Brown, the Court considered
whether an act of the California legislature prohibiting members of the Communist party
from serving as elected officials in labor unions violated the constitutional prohibition
against bills of attainder. Id. In determining that the act violated the constitutional
prohibition of bills of attainder, the Court concluded that the prohibition works to
implement the separation of powers and prevent a trial by the legislature. Id.
43
Examples of these laws for the executive branch are the War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (West 2003), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
Pub. L. No. 95-11, 92 Stat. 1796 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006)), both discussed in more detail later. Examples for the judiciary
include the Judiciary Act of 1888 which established the jurisdiction of the federal circuit
courts of appeals and regulated the removal of cases from state courts. Act of Aug. 13,
1888, 50 Cong. ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
44
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the Senate give consent by two-thirds majority
to ratify any international treaty, and provide advice and consent in matters of executive
appointments to governmental offices like ambassadors and appointments to the United
States Supreme Court); id. at art. III, § 2, cls. 2-3 (providing Congress with the power to
create laws setting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to create lower courts, and
determine the punishment for the crime of treason).
45
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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However, the only provision in the Constitution using the word “war” is
in the definition of legislative war power.46
A reading of the
Constitution may generally indicate that the president’s war power only
activates when Congress issues a declaration of war; however, the
president has used military force under both declarations of war and
congressional resolutions authorizing military action.47
Since World War II, the build-up of a standing army has altered the
balance of war power between Congress and the president, abdicating
Congress’s responsibility and shifting it to the president.48 However,
because of Congress’s ability to appropriate funds to support the
military, it alone retains the power to determine the number of soldiers
that make up the American military forces.49 Congress may also create
laws that regulate the administration of the military.50
This places Congress in the unique position of being able to reign in
the military activities of the executive by creating laws dictating
procedure that the president must follow in exercising his power as
Commander and Chief. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is a prime
example of Congress exercising this constitutional power. 51 It served to
prevent the president from relying on military appropriations bills as
authorizations for the use of military force.52 The impetus for the
resolution was largely Congress’s unwillingness to continue to fund
military actions in Vietnam.53 However, the War Powers Resolution is
not without its practical flaws; it is possible that the president could
circumvent the Resolution by interpreting the exceptions for exigent

46
Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress has the power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” Id.
47
John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 176 (1996). John Yoo’s article also notes that historically, the
legislature has only issued five declarations of war, and has favored issuing other
resolutions, or statutory provisions, which provide the president with the power to direct
the military into action. Id. In some situations, like the Korean War, Congress failed to
issue either a declaration of war, or a resolution providing authorization for the use of
military force. Id.
48
See also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 47-67 (Princeton Univ. Press 1993).
See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING (Texas
A&M Univ. Press 2000).
49
Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (2006) [hereinafter War
Power].
50
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
51
Id.
52
War Power, supra note 49, at 1820-21.
53
Id.
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circumstances to his benefit.54 One practical alternative to this structure
is for Congress to restrict military appropriations by limiting the funding
and the duration of these subsidies.55 Ultimately, the problem comes
down to whether the president has the ability to interpret acts of
Congress such as the War Powers Resolution and respond with military
force when alleged exigent circumstances arise.
Congress retains the power to enact laws restricting the power of the
executive as Commander in Chief, while the president retains the power
to defend the nation with military force when he deems it appropriate
because exigent circumstances require such action. Ideally, in an
instance where Congress intends an appropriations bill to subsidize the
military in times of peace, the president would be unable to exercise
military force absent an authorization by Congress.56 This does not
prevent the president from being able to invoke action in the name of
exigent circumstances to exercise military force when slow action by
Congress would make an emergency situation worse.57 The issue then
becomes whether legislation restricting executive power such as the War
Powers Resolution is an effective exercise of constitutional power. This
predicament necessitates the interpretation of the Constitution, and the
inherent conflicts in the provisions supplying the president and
Congress with their respective war power. In this situation, the Supreme
Court retains the authority to interpret the Constitution.58

ELY, supra note 48, at 123-25.
War Power, supra note 49, at 1832.
56
G. Sidney Buchanan, A Proposed Model for Determining the Validity of the Use of Force
Against Foreign Adversaries Under the United States Constitution, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 379, 417
(1992). Buchanan argues that the president does not retain the constitutional power to use
military force without the express authorization of Congress. Id. However, Richard
Hartzman argues that the president does retain the power to act as Commander in Chief
when participating in United Nations peace keeping operations. See Richard Hartzman,
Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A Constitutional Analysis of
Congress’s Power to Restrict the President’s Authority to Place United States Armed Forces Under
Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peace Operations, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50, 66 (1999).
57
The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 692 (1862). This case
is referred to as The Prize Cases because it concerned the capture of four merchant ships
during a blockade instituted by President Lincoln as part of his strategy to quell the
rebellion of the Civil War. Id. The public ships of the United States captured the four ships
as prizes, giving the case its pseudonym. Id. at 635-37. The Court concluded that in the
event that the president must respond to an emergency, he may act with his full power as
Commander in Chief of the military without the express authorization of Congress. Id. at
649.
58
See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151-52 (1803).
54
55
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However, the Court appears reluctant to become involved in
disputes between the other two branches and uses the political question
doctrine as a means to avoid reaching the merits of the disputes.
C. The Political Question Doctrine
Generally speaking, the Court invokes the political question doctrine
when it deems a question of law inappropriate for judicial review
because it should be resolved by the political process.59 In these
situations, interpretation of the Constitution is left to the politically
accountable branches of government.60 The Marbury v. Madison decision
is the genesis of the doctrine.61 There, the Court declined to adjudicate
whether they could award a writ of mandamus to James Madison
because the appointment power is inherent to the executive power, and
was not subject to judicial intervention under separation of powers
concerns.62 In addition, the Supreme Court has used the political
question doctrine when parties contest the validity of elections.

59
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.8.1, at 117
(Aspen 1997).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. § 2.9, at 151-52. While the Court fails to outright cite the doctrine of the separation
of powers as part of the basis of their opinion, language used by the majority and the
Court’s reliance on Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 demonstrate that the ability of the branches to
operate independently of one another based on their enumerated powers is of paramount
concern juxtaposed against the balance of powers. Id. § 2.9, at 151. For example, the Court
states:
The appointment of such an officer is complete when the President has
nominated him to the senate, and the senate have advised and
consented, and the President has signed the commission and delivered
it to the secretary to be sealed. The President has then done with it; it
becomes irrevocable. An appointment of a judge once completed, is
made forever. He holds under the constitution. The requisites to be
performed by the secretary are ministerial, ascertained by law, and he
has no discretion, but must perform them; there is no dispensing
power. In contemplation of law they are as if done.
Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803)). It is interesting that the
Court points to Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 in its reasoning. Federalist 78 focuses largely on the
role of the judiciary in the balance of power, and at one point Hamilton explicitly states
that the judiciary is an excellent prophylactic measure against despotism under a
monarchy. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 472. Hamilton
also noted that the judiciary is, under the separation of the powers, the least dangerous
branch of the proposed government. Id.
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Claims brought under the Guarantee Clause63 are consistently held
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine64 because they
typically involve challenges to the operation of republican government
or the electoral process. In Luther v. Borden,65 the Court refused to
address the merits of the dispute because it would require review of a
political question.66 Similarly, the Court refused to determine the
outcome of the Kentucky gubernatorial race in 1900.67 However, the
evolution of the doctrine demonstrates the Court has not applied it when
mediating disputes between the other branches of government.
In Baker v. Carr,68 the Court further defined the boundaries of the
political question doctrine.69 Specifically, the Court concluded that the
relevant considerations in determining if the doctrine applies are
whether the dispute deals with the finality of judgments by other
political branches and whether the dispute lacks sufficient criteria for
judicial determination.70 The doctrine is typically relevant in situations
where foreign relations,71 the duration of military action,72 the validity of
the legislative process,73 or the status of Indian tribes74 is at issue. In
these situations, the doctrine exists to preserve political order by
permitting sufficient respect for the role of the other arms of the

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Guarantee Clause states that “The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” Id.
64
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.8, at 122.
65
48 U.S. 1 (1949).
66
In Luther v. Borden, the Court considered whether the actions of police officials in
Rhode Island in 1840 violated the Guarantee Clause by declaring elections under a new
state constitution illegal. Id. The Court refused to deal with the issue under the political
question doctrine because it would require the Court to declare the entire state government
unconstitutional, thereby creating chaos. Id. at 42-44. Specifically, the Court stated that it
was the duty of the legislature to determine what kind of government existed prior to the
Court reviewing whether the existing government violated the Guarantee Clause. Id.
Creating the state government was a duty allocated to elected state officials and not an area
subject to judicial review prior to its outset. Id. at 45.
67
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
68
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
69
See generally id.
70
Id. at 210; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
71
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 311 (1918).
72
Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (noting the specific power of
declaration attributed to the Executive and Legislative branches); see also Hamilton v. Ky.
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919) (explaining the breadth of the war
power as including the remedies associated with military action and emergency situations).
73
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676-77 (1892).
74
United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865).
63
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government.75 Ultimately, the doctrine is limited to cases where a
government act is textually attributed to a political arm of the
government, where the judiciary lacks a manageable method of
resolving the issue, or when it is impossible for the Court to review the
issue because another branch has not made a necessary policy decision
that would give rise to a justiciable issue.76
Baker v. Carr demonstrates that the purpose of the political question
doctrine is to avoid conflicts between the power attributed to other
branches and the judiciary, which it accomplishes by limiting the scope
of judicial review. However, in the context of the war powers, conflicts
erupt between the legislative and executive branches because of their
concurrent constitutional power. The Court has rarely commented on
the constitutionality of the president’s exercise of military force.77 The
Brig Army Warwick, or the Prize Cases, is the primary authority in this
area.78 The primary issue before the Court turned on whether President
Lincoln was acting within his prescribed power when he authorized a
naval blockade of southern states that resulted in the capture of several
merchant vessels.79 In determining the distinction between the war
power of Congress and the president, the Prize Cases Court noted that a
state of war can exist without a formal congressional declaration.80 In
addition, the Court determined that the president must act during a state
of war notwithstanding the absence of a formal declaration of war from
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962).
Id. at 217. This definition of the doctrine comes from the oft-cited passage outlining
the purpose and application of the political question doctrine, which states:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according
to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political
question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id.
77
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 4.6.3, at 275.
78
The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
79
Id. at 641-42.
80
Id. at 653-54.
75
76
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Congress or the lack of legislative restrictions on the president’s exercise
of military might.81 However, a law retroactively subsidizing military
action and validating the president’s actions is inconsistent with the
structure of the Constitution because only Congress can determine when
a state of war exists.82
Essentially, the Prize Cases articulate two circumstances where the
president retains his power to wage war as Commander in Chief: when
Congress declares war, and when a state of war results from exigent
circumstances.83 In determining whether the presidential powers of war
activated under a legislative proclamation, the Court considered the
context of the conflict including the way the president himself referred to
the acts of the ceding states.84 Ultimately, the Court found that a state of
war, by an international definition, did not exist rendering the seizure of
the ships an invalid act under the Constitution.85 More specifically, the
Constitution provides for definitions of war in the legal context, stating
that only Congress may activate special presidential war powers because
only congress may determine that a legal state of war exists.86
This constitutional dichotomy, then, creates the kind of conflict Baker
v. Carr aims to prevent the courts from hearing. If Congress retains the
sole authority to create laws granting the president the ability to use
executive war powers, a presidential act inconsistent with an act of
Congress falls squarely within the political arena. But even with the
Court’s reluctance to involve itself with conflicts arising from the
political process, judicial attempts to refrain from becoming involved in
conflicts over the war powers will likely become impossible when
exercise of that power conflicts with civil liberties reserved by the Bill of
Rights.
Current tensions regarding President Bush’s electronic
surveillance program throw this problem into sharp relief.
III. WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: THE CURRENT PROBLEM
In December 2005, The New York Times published a story detailing an
initiative by President Bush permitting the National Security Agency
(“NSA”) to eavesdrop on international telephone calls and e-mails of

81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 661-63.
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 642-43.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 649.
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United States citizens.87 The purpose of gathering this intelligence88 is to
attempt to recover information that might aid in preventing a terrorist
attack.89 Regardless of its impetus, the program has raised constitutional
questions and sparked litigation by the American Civil Liberties Union
challenging the validity of the NSA’s program.90
In 1972, in Keith,91 the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
federal government’s approach to collecting intelligence under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,92 which allowed the
president to collect intelligence for national security purposes without a
warrant.93 Congress responded by drafting the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) in 1978.94 FISA creates a system of classified
courts that grant warrants allowing government surveillance activities
for the purposes of national security.95 These warrants are actually
orders obtained through ex parte application proceedings.96 However,
87

Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at A1.
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has
monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail
messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United
States without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track
possible “dirty numbers” linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said. The
agency, they said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic
communications.

Id.
“Intelligence” is defined by the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY
ASSOCIATED TERMS, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02 (Apr. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/, as amended from Aug. 15, 2005, in relevant
part as follows: “1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration,
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign
countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through
observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.” Id. at 264.
89
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at A1.
The Bush administration views the operation as necessary so that the
agency can move quickly to monitor communications that may
disclose threats to the United States, the officials said. Defenders of the
program say it has been a critical tool in helping disrupt terrorist plots
and prevent attacks inside the United States.
Id.
90
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E. D. Mich. 2006).
91
United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
92
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3711-3797y-4
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
93
Keith, 407 U.S. 297.
94
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1796
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006)).
95
Douglas C. McNabb & Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, the President, and the NSA:
National Security Agency Intercepts Within the United States, CHAMPION, Mar. 2006, at 10-11.
96
50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1802, 1805 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
88
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these warrant restrictions are not applicable in all cases because FISA
permits a grace period of fifteen days when the president instigates
foreign surveillance pursuant to a congressional declaration of war.97
As a result, the constitutional question raised by the NSA program
concerns its permissibility under the Fourth Amendment and the
president’s war power. In general, the Fourth Amendment protects
citizens from government intrusion by preventing unreasonable search
and seizure. 98 The warrant requirement provides the pragmatic
protection of this right by rendering searches presumptively invalid
without a proper warrant.99 Prior to the existence of FISA, the foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment allowed the
government to avoid the warrant requirement.100 However, FISA
changed this exception by legislatively requiring judicial review of
searches in the name of foreign intelligence.101 Additionally, the Keith
case had indicated that restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering are
not as strict as those applied to domestic surveillance.102
Currently, the president asserts that FISA does not apply to the NSA
program because the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”)103 provides an exception to the application of FISA giving the
president inherent authority to use all necessary force to pursue
terrorists.104 President Bush also argues that FISA hinders the ability of
the executive to wage the “War on Terror.”105 But his two reasons for
ignoring FISA create a constitutional conflict. The first reason questions
the power of Congress to regulate the operation of the military within

Id. § 1811.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 30 (providing text of the Fourth Amendment).
99
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
100
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); see also Arthur S. Lowry, Who’s
Listening: Proposals for Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 70 VA. L. REV. 297,
299 (1984).
101
In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); see also United
States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
102
Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
103
Authorization for Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001 (AUMF), Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
104
Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to Pat Roberts,
Chairman Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Peter Hoekstra, Chairman Permanent Select Comm.
on Intelligence, and Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Moschella Letter], available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/pdf/12%2022%2005%20NSA%20letter.pdf.
105
Milton Hirsch, A Letter to Congress, CHAMPION, Apr. 2006, at 50, 52-53.
97
98
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the structural balance of power, while the second implicates the Fourth
Amendment and existing limitations on the foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement.
But the current dispute between the legislature and the president
over the FISA structure focuses on whether the NSA domestic
surveillance program is within the ambit of the FISA exceptions.106 The
Department of Justice asserts that the AUMF constitutes an exception to
the FISA requirements because it provides the president with unlimited
authority to wage the “War on Terror.”107 If the AUMF does not
supercede FISA, then the NSA program is governed by section 1811 of
FISA and requires a declaration of war by Congress to validate the
president’s actions if they exceed FISA’s fifteen-day grace period for
wiretaps.
This illustrates that, on one hand, Congress has issued a statute
creating a structure of oversight dedicated to preventing the president
from abusing his war power and protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment
rights. On the other, the president continues to place wiretaps on
American citizens under the auspices of national security. Without
judicial intervention, the legislative and executive branches will remain
at an impasse. To solve this dispute, the judiciary should decide the
extent of legislative and executive power regardless of the political
question doctrine.
IV. THE JUDICIARY SHOULD MEDIATE THE DISPUTE OVER THE WAR POWER
The judiciary has the responsibility to interpret the language and
structure of the Constitution to determine when government action is in
violation of its various attributed powers.108 In a situation like the one
presented with President Bush’s NSA electronic surveillance program,
the judiciary must determine whether the executive has exceeded its
constitutional authority. Even though the Supreme Court has refused to
address the scope of presidential power during times of war under the
political question doctrine,109 the Court should review this situation
106
Section 1802 of FISA prefaces its application to “[n]otwithstanding any other law.” 50
U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). Section 1811 of FISA states that the
president is not obligated to obtain a FISA court order for fifteen days after the issuance of
a declaration of war by Congress. Id.
107
Moschella Letter, supra note 104.
108
See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 59, at 36-37.
109
See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
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because its existing precedent demonstrates that the Court should
mediate the dispute. In addition, the Court’s constitutionally-mandated
role in the operation of separate powers requires the Court’s
involvement.
A. The Legal Basis for Involving the Courts
While the Supreme Court has generally taken a hands-off approach
to decisions made in a time of war,110 the Court’s precedent
demonstrates its willingness to limit the actions of the other branches
under the doctrine of separate powers to preserve the liberty rights of
the citizenry.
First, the Court’s decision in the Prize Cases shows that it should
mediate the dispute surrounding the NSA surveillance program. The
Court established that when the president exercises his authority to use
military force and Congress does not act to rein in the exercise of that
power, the federal courts should not involve themselves with subsequent
disputes about the presidential exercise.111 While superficially this
appears to resolve the point of justiciability under the political question
doctrine and the separation of powers, the conflict presented with the
NSA program fundamentally differs from the situation presented in the
Prize Cases. Specifically, the Prize Cases demonstrate that the president
only retains the power to use military force where Congress has failed to
restrict his ability to act. FISA and the War Powers Resolution operate to
fill the void created by the Prize Cases: since their adoption, the
president no longer retains unilateral discretion to commit the military to
action. As a result, the Prize Cases, FISA, and the War Powers
Resolution work in concert to limit the executive war power.
In particular, FISA and the War Powers Resolution restrict the
exercise of the president’s power in several ways. The purpose of the
War Powers Resolution112 is to insure that full consideration by both
Congress and the president contributes to any decision that would put
American military forces into action.113 The Resolution places specific
See Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. at 111; Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302.
The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 649 (1862).
112
50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (West 2003).
113
Id. § 1541(a). Section 1541 articulates the purpose of the War Powers Resolution
indicating that it operates to
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States
and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
110
111
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limitations on the president’s power to act as Commander in Chief114 and
requires that the president involve Congress in decisions regarding ongoing military activity.115 Similarly, FISA restricts the president’s ability
to collect information from citizens by requiring that wire taps satisfy the
Fourth Amendment.116 Under these statutes, Congress has taken explicit
steps to control the boundaries of the president’s war power. In the
Prize Cases, the Court determined that it lacks the power to render a
decision in cases where the president exercises his war power when
Congress has failed to restrict his power, demonstrating that the
Supreme Court should mediate disputes in the area of the war power
when called upon to do so. 117 However, the Court’s decision in the Steel
Seizure case demonstrates that justiciability in a dispute between the
legislative and executive branches requires more than an act of Congress
restricting the president’s power.118
In the Steel Seizure case, the Supreme Court determined that the
president lacked constitutional authority to seize control of the nation’s
steel mills to ensure continued steel production during World War II.119
In analyzing the breadth of presidential authority under the war power,
the Court determined that any exercise of this authority must stem either
from an act of Congress or the Constitution.120 Justice Jackson’s
concurrence elaborated on this analysis by stating three classifications
for determining presidential authority.121
The first classification
provides the president with the most authority because he acts with the
permission of Congress, buttressing the president’s own constitutional
powers with all the authority Congress can delegate.122 The second
classification contemplates situations where the legislative and executive
branches share power, but Congress has failed to act.123 In this
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
Id.
Id. § 1541(c). In this subsection, congress relegates the president’s power to act as
Commander in Chief to only exist where there is “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” Id.
115
Id. § 1542.
116
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
117
The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 649 (1862).
118
See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
119
Id. at 588.
120
Id. at 586.
121
Id. at 636-39.
122
Id. at 636-37.
123
Id. at 637.
114
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classification, the president has independent authority.124 The final
classification illustrates that the president’s power is at its lowest when
he acts contrary to an act of Congress.125
Justice Jackson’s concurrence takes into account the division of
power articulated in the Constitution. With regards to the war powers,
the Court has concluded that only Congress can determine when a state
of war exists and thereby activate the full breadth of the president’s
power to act as Commander in Chief.126 In the current conflict over the
“War on Terror,” acts of Congress like FISA, the War Powers
Resolution,127 and the AUMF128 arguably activate President Bush’s
ability to act as Commander in Chief. If this is the case, the Steel Seizure
decision would require the courts to defer their judgments in favor of the
president.129 Conversely, if FISA, the War Powers Resolution, and the
AUMF serve to restrict executive military abilities, then presidential
power is at its lowest because programs like the NSA electronic
surveillance program operate contrary to acts of Congress.130
The president would likely argue that the NSA electronic
surveillance program falls within the first classification because the
executive receives the most deference from the judiciary.131 Under this
analysis, the president would retain the power to authorize the NSA
surveillance program and could wage the war on terror in any manner
consistent with the congressional grant of power. Alternatively, the
program could fall into the third classification, which is the least
deferential to presidential action.132 If the NSA program falls within the
ambit of FISA, then the Court must determine in which classification the
Id.
Id. at 637-38.
126
See The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 664 (1862).
127
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1796
(1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006)); see also
supra text accompanying notes 51-55. It is important to point out that statutes like the War
Powers Resolution and FISA originally intended to limit the ability of the president to
utilize all the tools available at his disposal without congressional or administrative
oversight.
128
See supra note 103. The AUMF, on the other hand, operates as an express grant of
power to pursue the war on terror. When the president exercises his military power under
the AUMF in opposition to the restrictions imposed by FISA and the War Powers
Resolution a conflict arises between these three laws. The resulting dispute can only be
resolved by applying the standards espoused in the Steel Seizure case and the Prize Cases.
129
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 636-37.
130
Id. at 637-38.
131
See id. at 636-37.
132
Id. at 637-38.
124
125
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program belongs and the degree of deference that the Court must show
to the president’s actions. Based on the Prize Cases and the Steel Seizure
decisions, determining the justiciability of a dispute between Congress
and the president requires determining the degree to which each branch
has exerted its constitutional authority. Determining which classification
applies should assist in deciding whether the political question doctrine
applies.
More specifically, if the first classification applies then the Court
should not get involved because the president is acting with the full
extent of his constitutional power. However, if the Court determines
that the president’s action falls into the third classification, then his
action receives the least amount of judicial deference. In such a situation,
the Court should not be bound by the political question doctrine because
the issue would be the constitutionality of the president’s actions where
Congress retains the sole authority to act. The operation of the separate
powers requires the Court to keep the president and Congress within the
ambit of their constitutional powers. However, it is possible that the
political question doctrine supercedes the concerns raised by the Prize
Cases and Steel Seizure. Even so, the Court should still consider the
merits of a dispute over the war power because it implicates a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Bill of Rights.
B. The Court Should Review the NSA Program Because It Implicates a
Fundamental Liberty Interest
In United States v. Nixon,133 the Court considered whether President
Nixon’s tape-recorded conversations in the oval office during the
Watergate scandal were subject to an executive privilege.134 However,
before the Court could reach the merits of the case, it had to determine
whether the issue was a nonjusticiable political question. In concluding
that the Court could decide the dispute, it noted that determining
justiciability is an inquiry that goes beyond the status of the parties; the
Court must look to the underlying issue in order to determine whether
the case is cognizable.135 The Court found that the issue typically arises
in the regular course of criminal prosecution, which is within the
traditional scope of judicial review.136 After making a determination of
justiciability, the Court found that the executive office lacked a
discernable privilege under the responsibilities enumerated in Article II
133
134
135
136
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of the Constitution because the existence of an absolute executive
privilege requires more than support from the doctrine of separate
powers and the need for confidentiality in communications at high
levels.137 Absent a need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, the Court declined to find a sufficient
confidentiality interest to support the executive privilege asserted by
Nixon in the Watergate investigation.138
Nixon demonstrates the role of the separation of powers in the
political question doctrine, but the opinion also highlights that the norm
of separation of powers has priority over the political question
doctrine.139 Separation of powers requires the Court to interpret the
enumerated powers in a way that demonstrates their separation but also
their balance.140 In Nixon, it was the Court’s concern for preserving the
constitutional balance that operates to preserve a workable government
structure.141
In addition, the Court has reviewed other cases on a very limited
basis when a superceding policy is at issue. In particular, the Court has
exercised its judicial power of review over political questions in cases
that typically incorporate constitutional principles that transcend the
operation of the political scheme. In United States v. Nixon, the Court
acted to prevent the crippling effect on the exercise of judicial power that
would follow from the creation of an executive privilege.142
Similarly, the Court has acted to protect individual liberties
notwithstanding the political question doctrine in Nixon v. Herndon.143
The Court in Herndon considered a racial discrimination policy regarding
voting in the Texas Democratic primary.144 The political question
doctrine did not protect the actions of the Texas legislature from judicial
Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 706.
139
Id. at 706-07.
140
Id. at 707; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
141
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635. The majority’s opinion in Nixon and Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in Steel Seizure are consistent with James Madison’s position in Federalist No. 48
when he noted the impracticability of strict adherence to the separation of powers. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 300. United States v. Nixon points out
an interesting example, noting the ineffectiveness of judicial determinations in a situation
where the president may assert a privilege that would prevent the Court from performing
its constitutional duty. 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
142
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
143
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
144
Id. at 539.
137
138
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review because the legislation refused a citizen the right to vote.145 The
Court determined that this refusal created a private right of action for
the plaintiff, and that relegating the claim nonjusticiable pursuant to the
political question doctrine would be a mere play on words because the
action itself involved the exercise of the political process.146
More recently, the Court used similar considerations on facts that
specifically operated within the political sphere. In Bush v. Gore,147 the
plurality used the fundamental constitutional interest in voting rights to
avoid the conflict posed by the political question doctrine.148
Interestingly, the Court justified rendering a decision based on having
the “responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the
judicial system has been forced to confront.”149 In its reasoning, the
Court purposely subordinated political question concerns.150 Similarly,
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court acted under the guise of due process
rights to justify its involvement and subsequently limitation of the
president’s power to wage war.151
In the dispute between Congress and President Bush over the NSA
domestic surveillance program, the political question doctrine is a viable
option that would allow the Court to avoid determining who retains
constitutional authority. But, the Court should not use the political
question doctrine to avoid rendering a decision if the case is brought
before the federal courts. Prior Supreme Court decisions, such as Nixon
Id. at 540.
Id. The Court has reaffirmed this position. See generally Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932).
147
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
148
Id. at 98-112. Practically, the Court’s decision leveled the playing field of voter rights
by making the value of each vote equal in general elections. The Court rendered its
decision over the objections of other members of the Court under the political question
doctrine. Id. at 142-43. Per Nixon v. Herndon, though, it is clear that the political question
doctrine does not apply to situations where voting rights are involved. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
The per curiam decision was built largely on the foundation of one-person, one-vote. Gore,
531 U.S. at 108.
149
Gore, 531 U.S. at 111. However, some commentators posit that the situation was not
cognizable by the Court on grounds of justiciability. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore was
not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001). Professor Chemerinsky argues that the
political question doctrine would have solved the problem by leaving the election to the
operation of the political process. Id.
150
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 242-43 (2002).
151
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516, 536-40 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 47585 (2004). Parts of these decisions operate to limit presidential power by invalidating
President Bush’s attempt to indefinitely detain prisoners because only Congress retains the
ability to suspend the process of habeas corpus. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
145
146

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/4

Smith: Breaking the Stalemate: The Judiciary's Constitutional Role in D

2007]

Disputes over the War Powers

1539

v. Herndon,152 Bush v. Gore,153 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,154 and Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,155 demonstrate that if a sufficient liberty interest or a
constitutional right is at risk, the Court might become involved and
resolve the dispute. The war power and the NSA program raise Fourth
Amendment concerns because NSA wiretaps constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment. This interest is sufficiently important for the
Court to approach the merits of the dispute between the legislative and
executive offices. Currently, President Bush’s position states that the
NSA program is within the confines of the FISA structure because
Congress authorized the use of force to pursue the “War on Terror.”156
FISA contemplates restricting the operation of government wiretaps on
international communications157 that involve communications by noncitizens.158 However, this implicates the right of individuals to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure.
In
particular,
the
NSA
program
necessarily
captures
communications where an American citizen is involved because it
targets international telephone and electronic mail communications
originating in the United States.159 This places the NSA program
completely outside the purview of FISA and squarely within the realm of
the Fourth Amendment.
Absent a national security or foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, the president would
have to obtain warrants for every domestic wiretap.160 But the Supreme
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
154
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
155
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The Court refused to permit President Bush’s plan for trying
suspected terrorists in the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because the plan
violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention. Id. at 2786-93,
2795.
156
AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Congress instructed the president “to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States . . . .” Id.
Congress’s grant of “all necessary and appropriate force” to pursue this task precedes this
language in the statute. Id. To determine whether the president acted within his
constitutional authority, the Court must confront whether this authorization supercedes
FISA though it explicitly states it does not supercede any part of the War Powers
Resolution.
157
50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
158
Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B).
159
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at 1; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
160
United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Keith established
that, regardless of its impetus, domestic surveillance requires satisfaction of the warrant
requirement by a neutral magistrate under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 316-17. This case
fundamentally denies the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement where the
targets of government surveillance are United States citizens.
152
153
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Court foreclosed the existence of a national security exception to the
warrant requirement in the Keith case.161 As a result, the NSA program
causes an inherent conflict between all three branches because the Fourth
Amendment requires a neutral fact-finder to issue search warrants.162
The doctrine of separation of powers dictates that the courts fill the role
of neutral arbiter in the criminal process where the Executive branch is
not neutral and disinterested when, through the Attorney General, it acts
as investigator and prosecutor.163 These actions fundamentally erode the
validity of the criminal process. Similarly, FISA represents the bare
minimum of judicial protection under the Fourth Amendment.164
President Bush’s refusal to cooperate with the restrictions set in place by
FISA adds to the conflict because the president ignores laws created
pursuant to the constitutional authority retained by Congress.
If cases like ACLU v. NSA reach the Supreme Court, the Court must
act to prevent the negative impact on liberty caused by programs with
presidential authorization like the one operated by the NSA. In his
dissent in Olmstead v. United States,165 Justice Brandeis explained that
“[t]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal.”166 Moreover, Brandeis explained that the government breeds
contempt for the law by breaking it, thereby inviting anarchy.167 The
NSA program stands to create anarchy if it continues to collect data
without adhering to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
When the government breaks the law, citizens lose trust in its operation
and refuse to adhere to it.168 The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s
right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.169 Additionally, the Court
Id. The Court pointed out specifically, “These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within
the discretion of the Executive Branch.” Id. at 316-17.
162
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
163
Barbara E. Bergman, When the Government Breaks the Law, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at
45.
164
Id.
165
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
166
Id. at 479. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not prevent the use of
information gained through telephone wiretaps without a warrant. Id. at 467-69. This case
was subsequently overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967). Justice Brandeis’s dissent articulates the dangers in permitting violations of the
Fourth Amendment, noting the importance of the privacy protected by the warrant
requirement, and the damaging effect on liberty resulting from diminished restrictions on
the ability of the government to intrude in the lives of the citizenry. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
474-76.
167
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
168
Id.
169
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
161
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has stated that the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police is the core of the Fourth Amendment and basic to a free
society.170 This concept is implicit in ordered liberty.171 Permitting
President Bush’s surveillance program to avoid the prohibitions of the
Fourth Amendment would allow the arbitrary invasion of privacy,
weakening the value of liberty in the Constitution as a result.
The evolution of the law surrounding the political question doctrine
demonstrates that the Supreme Court has found cases justiciable when
government action, either executive or legislative, implicates a
fundamental liberty interest. The NSA program violates the Fourth
Amendment, implicating a fundamental right protecting American
citizens from the abuse of government power. The Court must step in to
establish the boundaries of legislative and executive power to protect
this right.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional division of the war power between the executive
and legislative branches can cause an inherent conflict when one branch
exercises its power in opposition of the other. While the Supreme Court
would typically find such a conflict nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine, the Court should find these disputes cognizable if the
president oversteps the breadth of his constitutional authority impeding
upon the power attributed to another branch, or if it implicates a
fundamental liberty interest retained by American citizens.
President Bush’s domestic surveillance program, conflicts with acts
of Congress such as FISA and the War Powers Resolution. These acts
aim to rein in the president’s power to wage war, but the NSA program
seemingly disregards these restrictions. The program contradicts the
power of Congress. As a result, the Supreme Court must mediate the
dispute between Congress and the president because the executive has
invaded the constitutional authority retained by Congress.
Moreover, the NSA program collects the personal information of the
citizenry without a warrant, and the Fourth Amendment requires the
government to obtain a warrant in order to collect this information.
Because the Supreme Court has failed to recognize a national security
exception to the warrant requirement, the NSA program violates the
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. In
170
171

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
Id.
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order to prevent the harm to liberty that could lead towards anarchy, the
Supreme Court must determine the breadth of the president’s
constitutional power to exercise military force under the auspice of
national security.
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